Vom Vorlesungstranskript zum Lehrsystem

Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is commonly presented either as a straightforward neurodevelopmental disorder best addressed by diagnosis and treatment, or as a socially constructed label that primarily serves institutional interests. Both framings capture partial truths while obscuring the deeper ethical question at stake: how diagnostic language reorganizes authority, responsibility, and the architecture of choice in education and work. Using the critical tradition associated with Thomas Szasz as a springboard, these lecture notes develop an academically grounded framework for discussing ADHD that (i) distinguishes clinical utility from political and institutional consequences of medicalization, (ii) clarifies the normative nature of diagnostic thresholds on continuous trait distributions, (iii) integrates evolutionary ``mismatch'' perspectives to contextualize attentional and motivational styles, and (iv) derives policy-relevant implications for universities and workplaces, including universal design, needs-based accommodations that reduce dependence on diagnostic credentials, and robust informed-consent norms. The central claim is not that ADHD is unreal or that treatment is illegitimate, but that defaulting to medicalized solutions as the primary administrative lever risks eroding autonomy and narrowing acceptable cognitive diversity. A humane and scientifically responsible response requires parallel investment in environmental redesign, pedagogical pluralism, and procedural safeguards that keep the person---rather than the institution---as the primary locus of decision-making.

Perception begins as physics: structured energy and matter in the environment interact with biological receptors, are transduced into neural signals, and are ultimately interpreted as conscious percepts. This article develops lecture notes on the physics of perception for an upper-level Sensation and Perception course. The central aim is to specify what, exactly, sensory systems detect---not in terms of subjective experience alone, but in terms of measurable physical variables that reach the body and can be transformed into neural codes. We articulate a three-stage analysis that helps resolve classic philosophical puzzles (e.g., the ``tree falling in a forest'') by separating (i) events in the physical world, (ii) the subset of those events that can in principle be detected by a given organism, and (iii) the organism's perceptual experience and report. We then survey core forms of environmental energy relevant to human sensation: electromagnetic radiation (vision), mechanical pressure waves (audition), mechanical and thermal interactions at body surfaces and within tissues (somatosensation, proprioception, vestibular function), and chemical structures dissolved in liquids or suspended in air (gustation and olfaction). Throughout, we emphasize that receptor systems are adaptive sampling devices: they restrict access to only a narrow band of the physical world and introduce lawful distortions (amplification, attenuation, compression, nonlinearities) that support behavioral goals rather than veridical recording. We integrate foundational psychophysics (absolute thresholds, just noticeable differences, psychometric functions, Weber fractions) and decision-theoretic signal detection theory (detection as inference under uncertainty) as methodological bridges between physics and experience. Finally, we discuss the epistemic implications of sensory envelopes for evaluating extraordinary perceptual claims and for understanding why perception is reliable enough for survival yet systematically limited and biased.

Psychology’s modern history can be read as a sequence of changing answers to a deceptively simple question: What, exactly, is psychology allowed to study? From the late nineteenth century onward, the field repeatedly redrew its boundaries in response to conceptual disputes and methodological constraints. This lecture-based article offers an integrative narrative of major historical inflection points: Wundt’s laboratory psychology and the attempt to render consciousness measurable; early introspectionist programs and their internal tensions; Freud’s proposal of unconscious motivation and conflict; Jung’s expansion toward symbolic, cultural, and potentially transpersonal layers of mind; behaviorism’s rejection of mentalistic explanation in favor of observable stimulus--response relations and operant learning; Piaget’s developmental constructivism and the claim that children’s “wrong” answers reveal coherent cognitive structures; Eysenck’s psychometric and experimental critique of psychoanalysis and his insistence on measurement, prediction, and falsifiability in personality science; and Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory as a paradigm for studying belief revision under social and motivational pressures. Throughout, the guiding theme is not date memorization but the evolution of permissible questions, accepted evidence, and dominant paradigms. The article concludes by situating contemporary cognitive neuroscience as a powerful, though historically contingent, synthesis that still grapples with enduring challenges: the privacy of subjective experience, the interpretation of correlational evidence, and the philosophical implications of explaining agency through mechanisms.